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Commodity levies are used increasingly to fund producer collective goods such as
research and promotion. In the present paper we examine theoretical relationships
between producer and national beneﬁts from levy-funded research, and consider
the implications for the appropriate rates of matching government grants, applied
with a view to achieving a closer match between producer and national interests. In
many cases the producer and national optima coincide. First, regardless of the
form of the supply shift, when product demand is perfectly elastic, or all the prod
uct is exported, domestic beneﬁts and costs of levy-funded research all go to pro
ducers and they have appropriate incentives. Second, if research causes a parallel
supply shift, the producer share of research beneﬁts is the same as their share of
costs of a levy, and their incentives are compatible with national interests. In such
cases, a matching grant would cause an over-investment in research from a national
perspective. However, if demand is less than perfectly elastic, and research causes a
pivotal supply shift, the producer share of beneﬁts is smaller than their share of
costs of the levy, and they will under-invest in research from a national point of
view. A matching grant can be justiﬁed in such cases, however the magnitude of the
optimal grant is sensitive to market conditions.

1. Introduction
Commodity levies and matching government subsidies have come to play a
central role in the funding of applied agricultural research in Australia
(Industry Commission 1994), and levy-based funding is emerging as a more
important funding mechanism in other countries. In the present paper we
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develop a stylised model of a levy-based research funding institution. This
model captures the essentials of the Australian Research and Development
Corporation (RDC) framework, but is meant to be representative of a
more general class of such institutions as may be implemented in other
countries or at different times in Australia. 1 We derive and compare the
levy rate (and research expenditure) that a producer group – which for sim
plicity and concreteness we refer to as an ‘RDC’ – would choose to maxi
mise producer welfare and the levy rate that would maximise aggregate
national welfare. Among other questions, this assessment provides a basis
for evaluating the appropriate rate of matching government grant to sup
plement levy funds, for example the present common practice of a dollar
for dollar, or the lower 25 cents per dollar proposed by the Industry Com
mission (1994), or something else. 2
We use a partial equilibrium, competitive market model in a comparative
static format, building on models described by Duncan and Tisdell (1971),
Lindner and Jarrett (1978) and many others, as surveyed by Alston et al.
(1995). Previous studies have speciﬁed predetermined values for the rate of
levy, the amount of research, or, more commonly, the supply shift, and then
assessed the consequent changes in prices and quantities, and the effects on
consumer, producer and total economic surpluses. In contrast, the present
paper establishes explicit linkages between changes in the levy rate, total
research spending, and the size of the research-induced shift in the supply
curve, and consequent changes in market prices and quantities. We solve an
optimisation problem for the levy rate (and research expenditure) that would
maximise national economic surplus and show how that rate compares with
1

RDCs have been used in Australia, particularly since the mid-1980s, as a government
legislated institutional structure to internalise spillovers of R&D among the many producers
within a particular primary industry. Industry organisations negotiate with the Common
wealth government to set the levy rate, usually speciﬁed per unit of physical output but some
times in ad valorem form. The Commonwealth government provides matching grants, in most
cases on a dollar per dollar basis with an upper limit of 0.5 per cent of farm gate gross value of
production, but there are options to vary the subsidy. Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Australia (AFFA, 2002) provides more detail on the RDCs as presently structured. The Com
monwealth and State governments also directly fund applied and especially basic research
through the Commonwealth Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), univer
sities and government departments and agencies. Government subsidies for applied research
by the corporate sector, including agribusiness, are provided by tax concessions.
2
The compulsory levies are collected by the Commonwealth. In 2001–02 the government
distributed over #A400 million (levy receipts of #A209 million supplemented with the Common
wealth contribution of #A196 million) to the RDCs, who are responsible for the allocation
and administration of the funds among research projects (Troeth 2003). The balance of funds
reﬂects the fact that some RDCs set levies in excess of the 0.5 per cent upper limit such that
their overall rate of matching grant is less than 1:1, and some RDCs do not have a levy base
and are entirely funded by the Commonwealth.

the levy rate (and research expenditure) that would be chosen by a producer
group to maximise producer surplus. To make this analysis tractable, we
adopt and maintain the conventional assumptions of undistorted markets –
the absence of market power of ﬁrms, government price policies, and external
beneﬁts and costs in production – and we assume that the beneﬁts from the
R&D funded by the levy are reaped by consumers and producers of the
product on which the levy is collected. In the penultimate section of the pres
ent paper, we discuss the implications of relaxing these and other modelling
assumptions.
In the analysis, particular attention is given to the effects of the nature of
the research-induced supply shift (i.e., parallel versus pivotal shifts), com
bined with the elasticities of demand and supply, on the choices of optimal
levy rates and research quantities that would maximise beneﬁts for pro
ducers and society.3 We show that, in the case of a parallel supply curve
shift, the distribution of the beneﬁts from research between producers and
consumers of the commodity is identical to the distribution of the costs of
a levy used to ﬁnance the research. Consequently, for parallel supply curve
shifts, the producers’ optimal levy choice is the same as that for society, and
there is no need for a government subsidy. This result generalises to traded
commodities, even when some of the beneﬁts and costs may accrue to for
eigners.4 However, with a multiplicative or pivotal supply curve shift, unless
demand is perfectly elastic, producers bear a greater share of the incidence
of the levy than their share of research beneﬁts and, from a national per
spective, they will opt for too little research in the absence of matching govern
ment support. As we show below, the appropriate government matching grant
for the producer levy depends on relative elasticities of supply and demand
and the trade status of the commodity, along with other factors that inﬂu
ence the incidence of beneﬁts and costs.
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There has been much discussion in the published literature but as yet no consensus has
been reached about how to determine the nature of the research-induced shift of the supply
curve, whether it is parallel, pivotal, divergent or convergent – for example, Lindner and
Jarrett (1978, 1980), Rose (1980) and Wise and Fell (1980). One set of approaches uses a
representative ﬁrm model with the supply curve derived from a production, cost or proﬁt
function. R&D that augments factor inputs or enters the production function as a separate
input results in a pivotal supply curve shift, but Martin and Alston (1997) show that a paral
lel shift is obtained if technology enters the proﬁt function as a separate input. Another
modelling strategy allows for multiple ﬁrms with different reservation prices for entry to
industry supply, reﬂecting differences in their minumum average cost of production, for
example Wohlgenant (1996). The nature of the R&D induced supply curve shift then
depends in part on which ﬁrms along the supply curve adopt the R&D (or which reservation
prices are affected) and by how much costs are reduced. Accepting the lack of consensus
on this issue, we consider the extreme cases of parallel and pivotal shifts.
4

This point was made by the Industries Assistance Commission (1976, p. 267).

We begin by outlining the conventional commodity market model for
evaluating the effects on market outcomes resulting from R&D, a levy to
fund it or both combined. In section 3 we derive formulas for the researchfunding levy rates that would maximise national economic surplus and pro
ducer surplus, respectively, where the research causes either a parallel shift
or a pivotal shift in supply. These solutions are functions of elasticities of
supply and demand, the fraction of the commodity that is exported (allow
ing that the innovating country may be an exporter), the rate of matching
government support, and the social opportunity cost of government spend
ing. Theoretical solutions are interpreted in section 4, with particular atten
tion to the effects of matching government grants, or subsidies, for levy
rates and research conducted by producer bodies such as RDCs, and the
policy implications of the grants. To put the analytical solutions and inter
pretations into context, in section 5 we present numerical values for the
levy rates that would maximise beneﬁts for society versus producers, and
the corresponding rates of socially optimal matching grants, for various
sets of parameter values. These results are conditioned by various model
ling assumptions, including competitive market clearing and the absence
of market distortions, and, more fundamentally, our approach of using a
partial equilibrium model in which we represent research-induced techno
logical change in terms of shifts of commodity supply functions. In section
6 we review certain assumptions, and some caveats to the results. Section 7
concludes.
2. A heuristic model of the incidence of levy-funded research
In a standard commodity market model of research beneﬁts, research
causes the commodity supply curve to shift down and out against a stationary
demand curve, giving rise to an increase in quantity produced and consumed,
and a lower price. The collection of a levy on the product to ﬁnance the re
search has the opposite effects. The distribution of the costs of the imposi
tion of the levy between producers and consumers depends on the relative
elasticities of supply and demand.5 While the distribution of the beneﬁts and
costs of the research-induced supply shift depends on the same elasticities,
it also depends on the nature of the supply shift and, less importantly, on
the functional forms of supply and demand (Alston et al. 1995).
5

We use the Marshallian measures of consumer surplus for consumer beneﬁts and of
producer surplus for producer beneﬁts. In fact, producer surplus might include quasi-rents
to factors owned by farmers, namely land and managerial expertise, and also to suppliers
of other factors such as professional advice, fertilisers, and machinery where the supply of
these non-farm inputs is less than perfectly elastic. Similarly, consumer surplus might
include quasi-rents earned by after-farm input suppliers as well as by ﬁnal consumers.

Figure 1 A commodity market model with a parallel supply shift.

Consider ﬁrst the case of a parallel research-induced supply shift in a
model with linear supply and demand. In ﬁgure 1, D is the demand curve,
S0 is the initial supply curve, and S 1 is the supply curve following a k per
unit research-induced shift down of the supply curve. As a result of the
supply shift, price falls from P0 to P1, and quantity increases from Q 0 to Q 1.
The welfare effects include an increase in consumer surplus given by ∆ CS =
area P0 abP1, and an increase in producer surplus given by ∆ PS = area P1 bI1
− area P0 aI 0, which equals area P1bcd under the special assumption of a
parallel supply shift.6 National beneﬁts are given by ∆ NS = ∆ PS + ∆ CS =
area I0 abI 1. Now, suppose we introduce a tax of k per unit. This would
exactly reverse the price, quantity, and economic welfare impacts of the
parallel research-induced supply shift. Hence, if a k per unit tax could
ﬁnance a research-induced supply shift of greater than k per unit, there
would be net beneﬁts to producers, consumers, and the nation as a whole.
6

Here, k represents a vertical shift, down, or a k per unit reduction in unit costs. Alter
natively we can discuss a horizontal or output-expansion effect as j = (∂ Q/∂ P) k, where ∂ Q/
∂ P is the slope of the supply function. As noted by Alston et al. (1995), and more recently
elaborated by Oehmke and Crawford (2002), the elasticity of supply can have important
implications for measures of research beneﬁts if it is used to translate an assumed horizontal
shift into a vertical shift, or vice versa, in this fashion.

Figure 2 A commodity market model with a pivotal supply shift.

These net beneﬁts would be shared in direct proportion to each group’s
share of the costs, and so the research investment that would be optimal
from the point of view of the nation as a whole would also be optimal for
consumers and for producers.7 In this setting, if producers were empowered
to set a levy to fund research, their incentives to maximise their own beneﬁts
would be exactly compatible with the national interest, and there would be
no reason to encourage producers to do more of it by offering a matching
grant to help pay for the research.
Alternatively, suppose research causes a multiplicative (pivotal) supply
shift, as shown in ﬁgure 2, from S 0 to S 2.8 The total research beneﬁts are
now only roughly one-half of those from a parallel shift that would have
Speciﬁcally, the producer share of both beneﬁts and costs is given by the ratio η /
(η + ε ), where η and ε are the absolute values of the elasticities (or price slopes) of demand
and supply respectively. The consumer share is ε /(η + ε).
7
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For simplicity, we have held constant the effects on quantity of the parallel and pivotal
supply shifts, rather than the effects on per unit costs in the vicinity of the equilibrium. The
main issue for the comparison is the shapes of the geometric areas, not the sizes of them,
but it is worth noting that one source of confusion in the published literature has been dif
ferences among studies in what is being held constant in comparing alternative researchinduced supply shifts.

Figure 3 Producer and national incentives for different types of research.

the same price and quantity effects: ∆ NS = area I 0 a b. The consumer bene
ﬁts are the same as from the corresponding parallel shift: ∆CS = area
P0 abP1, while the producer beneﬁts are smaller: ∆ PS = area P1 b I0 − area
P0 aI0; and if demand were inelastic, producer beneﬁts would be negative. 9
Since the distribution of costs of a per unit levy coincides exactly with the
distribution of beneﬁts from a parallel research-induced supply shift, it fol
lows that consumers would receive more than their proportionate share of
beneﬁts from (or pay less than their share of costs of ) a pivotal researchinduced supply shift funded by a per unit levy. Similarly, producers would
receive less than their proportionate share of beneﬁts (or pay more than
their share of costs), and in this setting, producers would opt to fund less
than the national optimum quantity of research.
Figure 3 represents these ideas graphically, by showing how total and
marginal national and producer beneﬁts might be expected to change with
changes in the rate of levy or, equivalently, in the rate of spending on
research (R) ﬁnanced by the levy, and the implications for divergences to
9
Speciﬁcally, in ﬁgure 2, ∆ PS = 12 (P1 − I 0)Q 1 − 12 (P0 − I 0)Q0 = 12 (P1Q 1 − P0Q 0 − I 0 ∆ Q).
Given I0∆Q > 0, a necessary condition for producer surplus to increase is for total revenue
to increase (i.e., P1Q 1 > P0Q 0), and this requires that demand is elastic.

arise between farmer and national optima, R*(F ) and R*(N ), respectively.
The vertical axis measures total net beneﬁts. The uppermost curve (NS1)
represents national beneﬁts in the case of a parallel shift, and the next
curve (PS 1) represents the producer beneﬁts from the parallel shift. The
third curve down (NS 2) represents national beneﬁts in the case of a pivotal
shift, and the fourth (PS 2) represents the producer beneﬁts from the pivotal
shift. In this comparison, we assume that the costs of research are compa
rable for given market outcomes (i.e., effects on prices and quantities)
between the two types of supply shifts, and hence the national and pro
ducer beneﬁts from the pivotal shift are smaller for any given research
investment. In each case the relevant optimum is where marginal net bene
ﬁts are zero. In the case of the parallel research-induced supply shift, the
) = R *(N
). The national
producer and national optima coincide at R *(F
1
1
optimal quantity of research is smaller for the pivotal supply shift, and the
producer share of beneﬁts is smaller so that the producer optimum in this
case is less than the already smaller national optimum.
These results illustrate how, depending on the nature of the researchinduced supply shift, levy-based funding arrangements for research may or
may not lead to a socially efﬁcient outcome in terms of the total amount of
research provided. In the case of a parallel research-induced supply shift,
an RDC maximising total producer beneﬁts would also maximise national
beneﬁts in the absence of further government intervention. However, some
form of matching support from the government may be useful for correct
ing an under-investment in the case of non-parallel research-induced supply
shifts.
The heuristic model has abstracted from some important real-world
aspects that are especially relevant to a discussion of matching government
grant for research. In particular, most Australian commodities with RDCs
are extensively traded, mostly exported to other countries, which means
that demand is likely to be elastic, perhaps highly so. Indeed, for many
commodities, Australia’s relatively small share of world production implies
that a small-country assumption often may be a reasonable approximation,
which means we can effectively ignore the demand side altogether in our
analysis of research beneﬁts and costs. However, for several commodities –
for instance, wool, wheat, and beef – it might be argued that, in the relevant
intermediate length of run, although the demand for the industry’s output
is highly elastic, it is not perfectly elastic, reﬂecting the reality of extensive
policy interventions in trade, product heterogeneity, both real and per
ceived, and the importance of transport costs for low-value bulk commod
ities. In these cases, the analysis needs to be extended to partition the total
demand between domestic and export counterparts, since any beneﬁts to
foreigners would be given a different weight (perhaps zero weight) in the

calculus for maximising domestic welfare. This partitioning also means
that, in the large-country case, the national social cost is less than a dollar
per dollar raised using a commodity levy.
In contrast, the national social cost is more than a dollar per dollar of
expenditure from general revenue. Instruments used to raise the tax revenue
to fund subsidies distort decisions, for example, between work versus leisure,
saving versus spending, the choice of business structure and investment
options, and the mix of products produced and consumed. These distortions
result in deadweight or efﬁciency costs of taxes of at least 20 per cent (Campbell
and Bond 1997), which may have implications for the socially optimal
amount of research to fund, and the least-cost funding mechanism for agri
cultural R&D.
These issues of matching grants, trade status, and the social opportunity
cost of government funds are addressed in the more formal model that is
developed in the next section. Then, in subsequent sections, we evaluate the
implications of these aspects for the nature of the divergence between pro
ducer and national optimal levy rates, and for socially optimal matching
grants, in terms of both analytical solutions and numerical examples.
Throughout we maintain the assumption that the producer group or ‘RDC’
seeks to maximise total producer surplus, regardless of the distribution of
beneﬁts and costs among producers. As pointed out by a referee, this is an
important simplifying assumption. It is unlikely that the collective pro
ducer optimum will be optimal for every producer. Even though every pro
ducer pays a share of the levy, it is unlikely that each will receive the
corresponding share of the total beneﬁts; non-adopters, for instance, will
clearly be made worse off by levy-funded R&D. A more realistic model
might allow speciﬁcally for heterogeneous producers, with RDCs choosing a
portfolio of projects, aiming to achieve a more uniform distribution of bene
ﬁts than might result from simply maximising total beneﬁts – a political
trade-off of efﬁciency for equity in levy-funded research, as discussed by
Alston (2002). In our analysis, we effectively have taken the nature of the
(portfolio of ) levy-funded research and the research-induced supply shift as
given, but not the quantity of research. Then it makes sense for the RDC
to choose the quantity of such research that will maximise total producer
beneﬁts and for the government to encourage the RDC to choose the quan
tity of such research that will maximise total national beneﬁts, as assumed
in our analysis.
3. A more formal model
This section uses a more formal representation of the model of ﬁgures 1
and 2 to derive the levy rates, and by implication research quantities, that

society and producers would choose to maximise their respective objectives,
under a more-general set of conditions. To begin, we express the initial preresearch and pre-levy demand and supply curves in price dependent form
as:
D −1 (Q) = P = γ − δQ
S −1 (Q) = P = α + βQ
where P is the price, Q is quantity, and α, β, γ, and δ are given non-negative
parameters.
R&D is funded by a per unit levy, t, supplemented with a matching govern
ment grant at a rate, g, such that the research quantity, R, is given by
R = (1 + g)tQ.
Incorporating the effects of the levy, the equilibrium quantity and price are:
Qi =

γ −α −t
δ +β

Pi =

γ β + δα + δ t
δ +β

where P is the consumer price, gross of tax, and the producer price is given
by P − t.10
The research funded by the levy causes an outward shift of the supply
curve, and in what follows we consider two alternatives for the nature of
shift. In the case of a parallel shift, denoted by i = 1 in the expressions
above, research modiﬁes α in equation (2) and hence in equations (4) and
(5). In the case of a pivotal shift, denoted by i = 2 in the expressions above,
research modiﬁes β in equation (2) and hence in equations (4) and (5). In
other words, we incorporate the effects of parallel or pivotal researchinduced supply shifts in equations (4) and (5) by expressing either α or β as
a function of research spending, R, denoted by i = 1 or i = 2, respectively.
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The results do not depend on whether the policy is deﬁned as a per unit levy or an ad
valorem levy. Below, we express each solution for an ‘optimal’ per unit levy, t as an equivalent
ad valorem rate, τ, where τ = t/P, and identical results would have been obtained if we had
deﬁned the policy instrument as an ad valorem levy, instead, in the ﬁrst instance.

3.1 Parallel supply curve shift
For a parallel shift, as in ﬁgure 1, the intercept term of the supply curve ( α
in equation (2)) is a function of R, with ∂α /∂R < 0 and ∂ 2α /∂R 2 > 0 to
reﬂect diminishing cost reductions for extra research effort. Then, with
levy-funded R&D, the prices and quantities are given by solving
P1 = γ − δ Q1

(6)

P1 − t = α (R) + βQ1,

(7)

the solution for which will have the same form as equations (4) and (5),
with α (R) replacing α.
3.1.1 National optimum
National surplus is equal to the sum of domestic producer and consumer
surplus minus the cost to taxpayers associated with any matching government
support for research. Let us deﬁne d as the excess burden per dollar asso
ciated with that spending, such that 1 + d is the marginal social opportunity
cost (or loss of taxpayer surplus) associated with a dollar of government
spending on agricultural research. Therefore, the taxpayer cost is (1 + d )gtQ,
g
or, using equation (3), (1 + d )
R. Then, in the case of a closed economy,
(1 + g)
with all of the welfare impacts conﬁned to the domestic economy, national
surplus, NS1, is deﬁned as
NS 1 =

 [D
Q1

0

=

 g 
(x ) − S −1(x ) dx − (1 + d ) 
R
1 + g 

−1

]

(8)

 g 
1
(δ + β )Q 12 − (1 + d ) 
R
2
1 + g 

where the second line of (8) exploits the speciﬁc linear functions (6) and (7).
In the case of an exporting country, where domestic consumption is only
a fraction, κ, of total production, domestic consumer beneﬁts may be approx
imated by the corresponding fraction, κ, of the total ‘consumer’ beneﬁts.
Presuming that the government gives no weight to welfare impacts on foreigners,
we can approximate the exporter’s national beneﬁts using
NS 1 =

 g 
1
(κ δ + β )Q12 )− (1 + d 
 R.
2
1 + g 

(9)

Then, the nation will choose a research quantity, R, to maximise (9), which
will satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition implied by ∂ NS1 /∂R = 0, subject to the
constraint that expenditure on research is equal to the revenue raised by
the levy plus any matching support provided by the government, as in
equation (3).
Solving this maximisation problem yields an equation for the national
optimum levy rate, as a function of the elasticity of marginal cost with
respect to research, εC,R, the elasticity of supply, ε, the absolute value of the
elasticity of demand, η, domestic consumption as a share of output, κ, the rate
of matching government support, g, and the marginal excess burden of taxation
to ﬁnance government spending, d, which we can represent as follows: 11
−1


η+ε 
τ ≈ εC ,R 1 + (1 + d ) g
.
η + κ ε 


(10)

Notice that, in this equation, unless the government is applying a matching
grant (i.e., g > 0), the optimal levy is simply equal to the elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to research. Finally, using the deﬁnition that, under compet
itive market clearing, the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to research
(εC,R ) is equal to the elasticity of supply with respect to research ( εQ,R ) divided
by the elasticity of supply (i.e., εC,R = εQ,R /ε), we can write, equivalently,

ε
τ ≈ Q ,R
ε

−1


η+ε 
.
1 + (1 + d ) g
η + κ ε 


(11)

This form is more useful for comparing alternative forms of researchinduced supply shift, holding εQ,R constant.
3.1.2 Producer optimum
Consider now the RDC or producer objective function, which is to maximise
producer surplus, PS, given by
PS1 = (P1 − t)Q1 −



Q1

0

S −1(x ) dx =

1
β Q 21 .
2

(12)

11
Details of the solution procedure and the exact solutions for all of the optimal levy
rates discussed below are provided in the appendix. The exact solutions for the optimal levy
rates in every case (apart from the producers’ optimum with a parallel shift, in equation
(13)) are quadratic functions, but since research-funding levies are typically less than 1 per
cent, the quadratic term is negligible, and the linear approximation will be very close.

Producer surplus is maximised where ∂PS1/∂R = 0, which in this case is
where ∂Q1/∂R = 0. In other words, producer surplus is maximised when the
marginal impact on output of an increase in research spending is just bal
anced by the marginal impact of the increase in the research levy required
to fund that increase in spending. Using this ﬁrst-order condition with the
budget-constraint condition, from equation (3), implies the following solu
tion for the producers’ optimal levy rate, τp:

τ p = εC , R =

εQ , R
.
ε

(13)

Hence, the producer choice of R to maximise (12) implies the same levy rate
as the societal choice implied by (11) in the absence of a matching govern
ment grant; that is, τ p = τ if g = 0, as suggested by the heuristic model.
3.2 Pivotal supply curve shift
For a pivotal supply curve shift, as in ﬁgure 2, the β parameter of the supply
function (2) is replaced by βφ (R), with 0 < φ ≤ 1, ∂φ /∂R < 0 and ∂ 2φ /∂R2 >
0 to reﬂect diminishing cost reductions for extra research effort. Then,
with levy-funded R&D, the equilibrium price and quantity are given by
solving
P2 = γ − δ Q 2
P2 − t = α + βφ (R)Q 2

(14)
(15)

which yields solutions for the equilibrium quantity and price as expressed
in equations (4) and (5), with βφ (R) replacing β.
3.2.1 National optimum
Allowing once again for exports, with the domestic share of consumption
and consumer surplus represented by κ, when research causes a pivotal shift
of the supply function, national surplus is given by,
NS 2 =

 g 
1
(κ δ + β φ (R)) Q 22 )− (1 + d 
 R.
2
1 + g 

(16)

Then, as in the case of the parallel research-induced supply shift, to ﬁnd the
research quantity or levy rate to maximise national surplus, we combine the
ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum with the budget-constraint condition,
from equation (3). The result is:

τ ≈


1 εQ , R 
2(η + κ ε ) − (η + ε )

,
2 ε  (η + κ ε ) + (1 + d ) g (η + ε ) 

(17)

where parameters are deﬁned as above.
3.2.2 Producer optimum
Producer surplus, as deﬁned in equation (12), reﬂects the effects of both the
collection of a levy to fund research and the research-induced supply shift.
In the case of a pivotal shift, as shown in equation (15) the slope ( βφ) is a
function of research, which changes the implications for producer welfare:
PS 2 =

1
βφ (R)Q 22 .
2

(18)

Then, as in the case of the parallel research-induced supply shift, we solve
for the levy rate that would maximise producer beneﬁts by combining the
ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum derived from equation (18) with the
budget-constraint condition, from equation (3). The result is:

τp ≈

1 εQ , R  η − ε 

,
2 ε  η 

(19)

where the elasticities are as deﬁned above. As implied by previous work on
the incidence of research beneﬁts, it will be worthwhile for producers to
levy themselves only if demand is elastic (i.e., η > 1) since a pivotal supply
shift results in a reduction of producer surplus when demand is inelastic,
even when the research is provided for free (e.g., see Lindner and Jarrett
1978).12 Further, equation (19) means that producers will ﬁnd levy-funded
research beneﬁcial only if demand is more elastic than supply (i.e., η > ε).
Intuitively, the more elastic is demand, the smaller is the price reduction
effect of research in reducing producer returns, and the less elastic is supply
the greater is the cost reduction gain from a given output expansion.
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de Gorter and Zilberman (1990) compared producer and national optimal investments
in R&D, where the research could be funded entirely by producers, entirely by the govern
ment, or with a mixture of government and industry funding. Although they do not make
this interpretation, given their ﬁnding that producers are necessarily made worse off if
demand is inelastic, their results are consistent only with technological change that causes
a multiplicative supply shift. Further, they assumed that the producer funding would be
provided in a lump-sum way, with 100 per cent incidence on producers, rather than through
a levy, which enables some of the ﬁnal incidence to be shifted to consumers.

Table 1 Private (producer) and national optimal research funding levy rates: a large-country
exporter with matching grants (κ < 1; g > 0; η < ∞)
Parallel shift

Pivotal shift
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+
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(
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1
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(η + κ ε )



 (η + κ ε ) + (1 + d ) g (η + ε ) 

 (η − ε )/η
2(η + κ ε ) − (η + ε )



τ p /τ

4. Interpretation of analytical results
Table 1 summarises the analytical results in terms of equations for optimal
levy rates, for both the pivotal and parallel research-induced supply shifts,
from the points of view of both the nation (i.e., τ) and producers (i.e., τp).13
The ratio of the producers’ optimum to the national optimum provides an
indication of whether producers might over- or under-invest in levy-funded
research from the national viewpoint. As table 1 shows, in general the equa
tions for producer and national optimal levy rates differ. The nature and
causes of those differences can be illustrated by considering various special
cases. To consider the implications of the country’s trade status, we ﬁrst
assume the absence of government grants. Then we turn to a consideration
of the ‘optimal’ rates of matching government grants.
4.1 Implications of trade status
Table 2 includes the optimal levy rates implied by the more general coun
terparts in table 1 in the case with no matching government grants (i.e.,
g = 0). These results are consistent with our expectations, from the heuristic
analysis in section 2. Speciﬁcally, in the case of a parallel research-induced
supply shift the producer incentives for levy-funded research are compat
ible with the national interest, and producers’ choice of a levy rate that
maximises producer surplus will also maximise national economic surplus.
These results hold regardless of whether the commodity is traded or
whether the nation has market power in trade. Hence, in the case of a

13
If the research provides spillover beneﬁts in the form of lower production costs for
rest-of-world producers, the optimum levy rates for producers and for the nation as an
aggregate will be lower than these equations imply.

2 Private (producer) and national optimal research funding levy rates: a large-country
exporter with no matching grants (κ < 1; g = 0; η < ∞)
Parallel shift

τ

εQ,R /ε

τp

εQ,R /ε
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Pivotal shift
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Table 3 Effects of trade status on producer and national optimal research funding levy rates
for a pivotal research-induced supply shift with no matching grants

τ
τp
τp /τ

Large exporter
η < ∞; κ < 1

Closed economy
η < ∞; κ = 1

Small exporter
η = ∞; κ < 1
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parallel research-induced supply shift, a matching grant means that the
producers’ optimal levy exceeds the national optimum. In contrast, and
also as expected, in general the producer and national optima do not co
incide in the case of a pivotal research-induced supply shift, and a matching
grant might be warranted in this case.
To explore these and related aspects further we consider some other
special cases for the case of a pivotal research-induced supply shift. In table
3 we replicate the results for the case of a large-country exporter (i.e.,
η < ∞, and κ < 1) from table 2, and we compare these with the correspond
ing results for a non-traded good (i.e., η < ∞, and κ = 1), and a small-country
exporter (i.e., η = ∞, and κ < 1), all in the absence of matching government
grants (i.e., g = 0). The results in table 3 show that, in the small-country
case such that demand is perfectly elastic (i.e., η = ∞), τ p = τ ; the producer and
national optima coincide. In this case there are no price falls or consumer
beneﬁts, so producer beneﬁts represent national beneﬁts. In the closed
economy case, however, where demand is less than perfectly elastic, the
producers’ levy choice, τp is less than the national optimum τ, and the RDC

will invest less than the social optimum in R&D. In this case, consumers do
receive some beneﬁts, and the more elastic is supply relative to demand, the
larger is the discrepancy between the producer optimum and the national
optimum. This result formalises the earlier discussion suggesting that, with
a pivotal supply curve shift, the producers’ share of the levy costs is greater
than their share of the beneﬁts from research. Hence, a subsidy may be
required to induce producers to choose the socially optimal levy rate. Fur
ther, considering the results in table 2 and table 3 together, we can see that
in the case of a small exporter or a closed economy, the nation’s optimal
levy in the case of a pivotal shift is half that for a parallel shift. 14
4.2 Optimal rates of matching government grant
This section draws on the preceding results to assess the consequences of
matching grants for levy rates and draw implications for the ‘optimal’ rate
of matching grant; that is, that rate that will result in a producer or RDC
choice of levy rate that will maximise net national beneﬁts ( τ = τ p). In the
case of a parallel supply shift, the optimal rate of matching grant is zero,
regardless of the other elements of the model. However, in the case of a
pivotal supply shift, the optimal rate of subsidy will vary with the relative
elasticities of demand and supply. To ﬁnd the optimal rate of matching sup
port, we set τ from equation (17) equal to τ p from equation (19) and solved
for g. The result is:
−1



η
κε
g* =
= κ (1 + d )  − 1  .
(1 + d )(η − ε )
ε



(20)

Then, the optimal matching grant is greater, the less important are exports,
the more elastic is supply relative to demand, and the smaller is the social
opportunity cost of government revenue. Only by an unlikely coincidence
will equation (20) imply a value of g = 1, necessary to warrant a dollar for
dollar matching grant.
In summary, we have identiﬁed several scenarios in which an RDC seek
ing to maximise domestic producer surplus could be expected to choose the
levy and quantity of research that will maximise national research beneﬁts.
This incentive compatibility is found regardless of elasticities or the country’s

14
In table 2, in the case of a parallel shift regardless of trade status the national optimum
is τ = εQ,R /ε, and in table 3 in the case of a pivotal shift for a closed economy or a small
open economy the national optimum is τ = 12 εQ,R /ε.

trade status in cases when research causes a parallel shift of the supply
curve, but only if all of the commodity is exported (i.e., κ = 0) or demand is
perfectly elastic in cases when research causes a pivotal shift of the supply
curve. In any of these scenarios, justiﬁcation for government matching
grants for the types of applied research funded by RDCs would have to be
based on either the view that surplus accruing to producers and consumers
of the commodity does not represent national beneﬁts (owing to spillover
beneﬁts to other commodities and parts of the economy, as considered by
the Industry Commission 1994),15 or a perception that RDCs were not seek
ing simply to maximise total domestic producer surplus, regardless of its
distribution (for reasons such as those suggested by Alston (2002), including
diversity of interests among heterogeneous producers within an industry
covered by an RDC, and inter-temporal distributional aspects).
In contrast, we have shown that where research leads to pivotal shifts of
the supply curve, and demand is less than perfectly elastic, producers will
choose a lower levy rate and less research than would be optimal for soci
ety. Here there is a prima facie case for some form of government subsidy.
However, our analysis ﬁnds against a blanket dollar for dollar matching
grant (i.e., g = 1) for all situations. First, if demand is inelastic, or the
demand elasticity is less than the supply elasticity, producers will choose a
zero levy even though society would beneﬁt from research, regardless of a
matching grant, making it an ineffective subsidy instrument. Second, even
in those scenarios where producers would in their own interests levy them
selves to fund research, but by less than would maximise national welfare,
the optimal matching grant will vary with the commodity supply and
demand elasticities and with the importance of trade.
5. Illustrative numbers
This section provides estimates of the levy rates that would maximise bene
ﬁts to producers and the nation under a range of market assumptions, to
illustrate the contrasts and similarities between these rates under different
market circumstances. In particular, the illustrations highlight the import
ance of parallel versus pivotal research-induced supply shifts and, for the
case of a pivotal supply curve shift, the importance of different demand
and supply elasticities and export shares of total sales. In all the illustra
tions we assume an elasticity of output with respect to research, εQ,R of
0.01. For a parallel supply curve shift and supply elasticity of ε = 1, the
15
Given the emphasis of RDC research portfolios on applied research, the relative
importance of cross-commodity spillovers has been challenged (e.g., Industry Commission
1994).

Table 4 Effects of elasticities on choices of levy rates by society and producers to fund pivotal
and parallel research-induced supply shifts in a closed economy
Pivotal shift
Supply
elasticity

Demand
elasticity

1.0

0.2
0.5
1.0
2.0
4.0

2.0

0.2
0.5
1.0
2.0
4.0

Parallel shift
τp = τ

τ

τp

– optimal rates times 100 per cent –
1.00
0.50
–
1.00
0.50
–
1.00
0.50
–
0.25
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
0.38
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

–
–
–
–
0.13

g
–
–
–
1.00
0.33
–
–
–
–
1.00

elasticity of output with respect to research is equal to the elasticity of mar
ginal and average cost with respect to research, εQ,R = εC,R, and the optimal
levy rate for both producers and the nation is τ p = τ = 0.01, or 1 per cent.
Current Australian RDC levy rates are less than 1 per cent.
Table 4 reports values of the research levy rates expressed in percentage
terms (i.e., τp or τ times 100), which maximise either national welfare or
producer surplus for the case of a non-traded commodity (i.e., where
domestic consumption equals production and κ = 1). We combine supply
elasticities of 1.0 or 2.0 with a domestic demand elasticity of 0.2, 0.5, 1.0,
2.0, or 4.0, and consider cases where R&D shifts the supply curve either in
a parallel fashion or pivotally. For example, with a supply elasticity of 1.0
and a demand elasticity of 0.2, for a parallel supply shift both producers
and society would chose a 1.0 per cent levy rate, but for a pivotal shift society
would set a 0.5 per cent levy and producers a zero levy rate. In this setting,
with ε = 1 and η = 2, a matching grant of one dollar per dollar would be
optimal if the marginal social opportunity cost of government spending is
#A1.00 (i.e., d = 0.0), 83.3 cents per dollar if the marginal social opportunity
cost is #A1.20 (i.e., d = 0.20). But these are comparatively unlikely elasticity
scenarios. In most cases the domestic demand for agricultural products is
likely to be highly inelastic, and this means that demand for non-traded
goods is likely to be less elastic than supply such that producers will not
proﬁt from pivotal supply shifts.
The levy rates in table 4 can be read in conjunction with the general
propositions illustrated in ﬁgure 3. For a parallel supply curve shift, pro
ducers and society choose the same levy rate. The levy rate does not depend
on the demand elasticity, but a larger supply elasticity reduces the levy rate

Table 5 Effects of trade status on choices of levy rates by society and producers, and the opti
mal rate of matching grant, for a pivotal supply shift, ε = 1 and εQ,R = 0.01
Levies (%)

Optimal
matching grants (%)
(g × 100)

Export
demand
elasticity
(ηe)

Total
demand
elasticity
(η)

National
optimum
(τ × 100)

Producer
optimum
(τ p × 100)

100 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
20
10
5
1

0.50
0.48
0.45
0.40
0.00

0.50
0.48
0.45
0.40
0.00

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

80 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
16.0
8.0
4.0
0.8

0.50
0.48
0.45
0.41
0.12

0.50
0.47
0.44
0.38
0.00

0.0
1.3
2.8
6.6
–

0.0
1.1
2.4
5.5
–

50 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
10.1
5.1
2.6
0.6

0.50
0.48
0.46
0.42
0.27

0.50
0.45
0.40
0.31
0.00

0.0
5.5
12.2
31.3
–

0.0
4.5
10.2
26.0
–

20 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
4.1
2.1
1.2
0.4

0.50
0.48
0.47
0.45
0.41

0.50
0.38
0.27
0.07
0.00

0.0
25.3
69.0
500.0
–

0.0
21.1
57.5
416.7
–

Non-traded

–

0.2

0.50

0.00

–

–

Export
share of sales
((1 − κ ) × 100)

(d = 0.0)

(d = 0.2)

Entries are based on domestic supply and demand elasticities of ε = 1.0, and ηd = 0.2
η = κηd + (1 − κ )ηe

because it translates a given quantity increase resulting from research into
a smaller per unit cost reduction. For a pivotal supply curve shift, the
national optimum levy rate is half of that for a parallel shift. The producers’
optimum levy rate is smaller again, and the results in table 4 conﬁrm that
producers would not invest in levy-funded R&D when demand is inelastic
and, when it is elastic, only when demand is more elastic than supply. The
majority of situations covered in the table would see no producer invest
ment in levy-funded research, even though such activity would be of value
to society.
Table 5 reports estimates of the national and producer optimal levy rates
for the case of an exported product where R&D causes a pivotal shift of the
supply curve, under various market circumstances, as well as the cor
responding rates of matching government grants required to equate the
national and producer optimal levy rates. Estimates were computed by

combining export shares (100 times 1 − κ) of 100 per cent, 80 per cent, 50
per cent, or 20 per cent with export demand elasticities of ∞, 20, 10, 5 or 1,
and a domestic supply elasticity of 1 (comparable results using a supply
elasticity of 2 are reported in table 6). For all cases the domestic demand
elasticity is held constant at 0.2, and the elasticity of output with respect to
research is set at 0.01, as for table 4. The derived aggregate demand elasti
city in the third column is the share-weighted average of the export demand
elasticity and the ﬁxed domestic demand elasticity (e.g., an export elasticity
of 10 with 50 per cent exports gives a derived total demand elasticity of
5.1). This means that changes in the domestic share ( κ) imply changes in
the overall demand elasticity (η), and in our solutions the indirect effect on
η is more important than the direct effect of changing κ. Each row of the
table shows the optimal levy rates and optimal rates of matching grant
implied by a particular combination of elasticities. For instance, where 80
per cent of the product is exported, with an export demand elasticity of 5
and a supply elasticity of 1, society would choose a levy rate of 0.41 per
cent, and producers would choose a lower levy rate of 0.38 per cent. In this
scenario, if the government were to offer a matching grant of g = 6.6 per
cent (or 6.6 cents per dollar of levy revenue), the producers’ optimal choice
of levy rate would become the rate that would maximise national welfare.
If, however, a dollar of government spending entailed a marginal opportu
nity cost of #A1.20 per dollar, the optimal rate of matching grant would be
reduced to 5.5 per cent.
Some key results highlighted in table 5 are as follows. When export
demand is perfectly elastic, or when all of the product is exported, there are
no domestic consumer beneﬁts from research, and producers choose the
levy rate that would maximise national net beneﬁts. In all other cases pro
ducers choose a lower levy rate, and the difference is greater the less import
ant are exports and the less elastic is export demand (i.e., when the overall
demand is less elastic). Table 6 replicates table 5 using a supply elasticity of
2.0 instead of 1.0. It can be seen that a larger supply elasticity reduces the
levy rates that would be chosen by both the nation and producers, but the
patterns in the results are otherwise similar.
In many cases, with a pivotal supply shift, the levy rate chosen by pro
ducers will be very different from the national optimum. This divergence
increases as we move down the tables (5 and 6), increasing the domestic
consumption share, the main consequence of which is to reduce the overall
demand elasticity, reducing the export demand elasticity, which also
reduces the overall demand elasticity, or both. In extreme cases (with 20 per
cent or less of the commodity exported and an export demand elasticity of
10 or less), the implied overall demand elasticity is 2.1 or less. Given a sup
ply elasticity of 1 or 2, such a small demand elasticity implies a very large

Table 6 Effects of trade status on choices of levy rates by society and producers, and the opti
mal rate of matching grant, for a pivotal supply shift, ε = 2 and εQ,R = 0.01
Levies (%)
Export
demand
elasticity
(η e)

Total
demand
elasticity
(η )

National
optimum
(τ × 100)

Producer
optimum
(τ p × 100)

100 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
20
10
5
1

0.25
0.23
0.20
0.15
0.00

0.25
0.23
0.20
0.15
0.00

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

80 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
16.0
8.0
4.0
0.8

0.25
0.23
0.20
0.16
0.00

0.25
0.22
0.19
0.13
0.00

0.0
2.9
6.6
19.6
0.0

0.0
2.4
5.5
16.3
0.0

50 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
10.1
5.1
2.6
0.6

0.25
0.23
0.21
0.18
0.09

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.06
0.00

0.0
12.4
32.3
166.7
–

0.0
10.3
26.9
138.9
–

20 (%)

∞
20
10
5
1

∞
4.1
2.1
1.2
0.4

0.25
0.23
0.22
0.21
0.20

0.25
0.13
0.02
0.00
0.00

0.0
74.1
1000.0
–
–

0.0
61.7
833.3
–
–

Non-traded

–

0.2

0.25

0.00

Export
share of sales
((1 − κ ) × 100)

Matching grants (%)
(g × 100)
(d = 0.0)

–

(d = 0.2)

–

Entries are based on domestic supply and demand elasticities of ε = 2.0, and ηd = 0.2
η = κηd + (1 − κ )ηe .

rate of matching grant, but the implied rate is very sensitive to changes in
the parameters. In contrast, in the case of a parallel research-induced shift
in supply, the optimal levy rates chosen by both the nation and producers
for all market circumstances described in table 5 would be 1 per cent for a
supply elasticity of 1 and 0.5 per cent for a supply elasticity of 2, with no
inﬂuence by the export demand elasticity or share of product exported on
the levy rate.
6. Some caveats
We have assumed that all of the beneﬁts and costs of the levy-funded
research accrue to the producers and consumers of the commodity being
levied. This assumption has a number of elements, which we will address in
turn.16 First, the assumption ignores spillover beneﬁts of research to other
©

commodities and public good beneﬁts, such as the beneﬁts to the wider soci
ety from, say, greater environmental amenity and biodiversity. Of course
this is unrealistic; however, in practice only a small share of the funds dis
tributed by Australian RDCs has gone to projects for basic research or to
generate public good type environmental beneﬁts. 17 In contrast, technology
resulting from levy-funded research might nevertheless entail substantial
positive or negative externalities (associated with the environment, food
safety, or something else) and to the extent that this is so there will be
divergences between social and private beneﬁts and hence between social
and private optimal research levy rates, even when research causes a paral
lel shift in the supply function.
Second, the competitive market model assumes negligible policy distortions,
and also the absence of external costs and beneﬁts, for the commodity. The
absence of agricultural policy interventions is a reasonable assumption for
almost all Australian agricultural commodities. The associated assumption
of no market power of ﬁrms is satisfactory for farm production and also on
the commodity demand side when the actual and potential threat of inter
national trade is recognised. However, agricultural policy distortions are of
signiﬁcance for most countries. As shown by Alston et al. (1988), Martin
and Alston (1994), Alston and Martin (1995) and others, policy distortions
alter the total beneﬁts from R&D, and especially the distribution of bene
ﬁts between producers and other groups in society. Extrapolating from
these studies we can infer that policy distortions could result in substantial
discrepancies between the levy rates that would maximise beneﬁts to pro
ducers versus society. The same results also would suggest that the nature
and extent of the differences between producer and national optimal levy
rates will depend crucially on the details of the policy, the international
trade status of the commodity, and the type of supply curve shift. Similar
16

We can interpret these elements as left out beneﬁts (or costs) accruing to the economy
more broadly, to producers and consumers of closely related commodities, to technology
suppliers or other agribusiness ﬁrms that have market power in the commodity or the techno
logy, to consumers of environmental amenities, or to taxpayers through government revenues
where commodity price policies are applied.
17

AFFA (2002) report that many RDC projects provide beneﬁts for the environment,
food safety and for regions. Arguably, most of these beneﬁts accrue to the producers and
consumers of the commodities, and are fully reﬂected in the returns to producers, consum
ers, and society, as measured in the present paper. Some other beneﬁts reduce external costs
associated with production and can be regarded as savings to producers through reduced
costs of current or future regulations or taxes on pollution externalities. A relatively small
share of the research beneﬁts from these projects have public-good properties that would
show up in social beneﬁts but not in beneﬁts to producers or consumers. Also, those RDCs
most involved in supporting projects yielding public-good environmental beneﬁts, for
example Land and Water Australia, are fully government funded with no producer levy.
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ﬁndings would apply where markets are distorted as a result of market
power of ﬁrms or environmental externalities (e.g., see Alston et al. 1995).
Third, our analysis ignores cross-commodity impacts of the collection of
the levy or the research it is used to fund. It is easy to imagine a scenario
in which research on one commodity (and, indeed, the levy to fund it) has
signiﬁcant impacts on the market for another commodity that is closely
related in production, consumption, or both (for instance, beef and lamb in
Australia or beef and pork in the USA). Our partial equilibrium model
assumes that second-round and feedback effects of changes in the commod
ity studied on prices and quantities in the rest of the economy are of secondorder importance. Given the relative unimportance of the agricultural sector,
it seems reasonable to prefer the simplicity of a partial equilibrium model
versus a general equilibrium model, but in some cases a multi-commodity
model may be necessary to capture all the relevant effects. Again, this is an
empirical issue, to be determined on a case by case basis.
Fourth, we have ignored the possibility of technology ﬁrms having mar
ket power – through patents, trade secrets or other forms of intellectual
property – in either the technology being produced or the technology it
replaces. If ﬁrms have property rights over technologies, and collect
monopoly rents accordingly, then a complete analysis of the social beneﬁts
must account for changes in rents to technology providers, which do not
show up in the commodity market measures of consumer and producer
surplus (e.g., see Moschini and Lapan 1997). Further, levy-funded research
results might be subject to intellectual property protection with implica
tions for the total beneﬁts and their distribution. These aspects are prob
ably of minor importance in the context of Australian levy-funded research
to date, but are likely to become more important with time.
We can anticipate some general implications of these various factors. To
the extent that there are spillovers or other beneﬁts beyond the producers
and consumers of the commodity being levied, our results understate the
social beneﬁts from the R&D, and they understate the desirable level of
matching government grant. On the other hand, when new agricultural
technology results in excessive consumption of natural resource stocks or
involves other negative externalities, or other costs beyond the commodity
being levied, the converse may be true. To make more speciﬁc statements
would require more speciﬁc information. In the Australian context, how
ever, we would suggest that for most commodities and for most types of
levy-funded research, it is not unreasonable to set these complications aside
for the type of work being done in the present paper.
Finally, our results are based on a premise that total producer surplus
(measured off the commodity supply function at wholesale, say) is the
relevant measure of beneﬁts to be maximised by the RDC. Increasingly,

however, RDCs are being directed to consider community-wide priorities –
such as concerns with externalities associated with agricultural production
– when allocating funds, and they have to report against them as an ele
ment of meeting requirements for the matching government grants. The
extent to which such externalities exist or are effectively addressed and mit
igated by RDC-funded research remains a matter for speculation. Never
theless, it seems likely that the concern with community-wide impacts has
received enough attention such that it is an effective constraint on the RDC
research portfolios, to the extent that RDCs will have changed both their
true research priorities and how they report their actions and achievements.
If such a constraint is meaningful, the producer beneﬁt from a given
amount of research spending will be lower while the social beneﬁt may be
higher or lower, with an ambiguous effect on the size of the discrepancy
between the private and social optimal levy rates, and the rate of matching
government grant. In addition, where levy-funded research has unequal
impacts on heterogeneous producers, it may be too simple to assume that
the RDC chooses a levy rate and a research portfolio strictly aiming to
maximise total producer net beneﬁts, without regard to the distribution of
those beneﬁts among producers.18 An extension to allow for more complex
objective functions would be challenging and is beyond the scope of the
present work.
7. Conclusion
It has been suggested by some authors that compulsory levy-based funding
supported by matching government grants is, in principle, a fair and efﬁ
cient way of ﬁnancing applied agricultural research, and that this approach
helps account for Australia’s comparatively high public agricultural re
search intensity ratio (e.g., Alston et al. 1999). Some have quantiﬁed the
implications of these arrangements for the distribution of the beneﬁts and
costs of different types of agricultural research (e.g., Mullen et al. 1989;
Zhao 2003; Zhao et al. 2003). In the present paper we have questioned
some of the premises from the previous studies concerning the fairness and
efﬁciency of levy-based funding. To do this we formally modelled the deci
sion calculus of producer bodies such as RDCs, and compared their optimal
rates of research levies with the rates that would be optimal for the nation
as a whole. We explored how this comparison depends on the nature of the
research-induced technical change and market conditions such as the
18
A reviewer suggested that unequal impacts among heterogeneous producers might be
a further reason why a matching grant may be required to encourage producer organisa
tions to implement research levies. Alston (2002) offers some more detailed discussion.

elasticities of supply and demand, and the country’s trade status in the
commodity in question.
A conventional approach would use producer surplus measured off the
commodity supply function as the maximand for the RDC, with national
beneﬁts equal to the sum of producer surplus and domestic consumer sur
plus. Hence, we assumed all the beneﬁts and costs of the levy and the
research it funds accrue to the producers and consumers of the commodity
– that is, there are no inter-industry spillover effects of the R&D, and any
effects of distortions arising from government price policies, market power
of ﬁrms, and external beneﬁts and costs in production, are minimal. Using
this approach, producer incentives and national interests coincide exactly
for levy-funded research under a range of circumstances. These include 100
per cent levy funding that gives rise to a parallel research-induced supply
shift, regardless of the demand elasticity, or a pivotal research-induced sup
ply shift when demand is perfectly elastic or all of the product is exported.
In the pivotal case, when demand slopes down, the producer optimum is
less than the national optimum. Importantly, when demand is inelastic, or
demand is less elastic than supply, the producer optimum is zero, even
when some investment in research is clearly in society’s interest.
Our analysis provides several observations on the virtues of match
ing government grants for producer levies for research. Where demand is
perfectly elastic or all production is exported, or where research leads to
parallel supply curve shifts, producers already have appropriate incentives in
the absence of a matching grant. More generally, with pivotal supply curve
shifts and a less than inﬁnitely elastic demand, the required matching grant
to induce producer decisions consistent with the social optimum varies with
the export share and with the elasticities of product demand and supply,
and only by coincidence would the socially optimal matching grant be dollar
for dollar. When demand is inelastic, or the demand elasticity is less than
the supply elasticity, producers will choose a zero levy rate regardless of the
matching grant. Against these observations, current general policy of a
blanket dollar for dollar matching grant is clearly sub-optimal, even with
out the complications of spillovers, environmental impacts, commodity
price policies, or other distortions. The socially optimal policy is strictly an
empirical question that will vary from industry to industry and case to case,
and within industries, among different types of levy-funded research. Theor
etical analysis such as that in the present paper, alone, cannot answer this
question but has demonstrated the importance of further work to pursue a
speciﬁc answer.
Clearly, our simplifying assumptions of no spillover R&D beneﬁts and
no market distortions will not ﬁt the facts for every situation, and the
implications of relaxing these assumptions represent areas for further

model development as well as qualiﬁcations to the policy implications. The
simplifying assumptions are not unreasonable for the Australian setting.
For most projects, but certainly not all projects, funded by RDCs in Aus
tralia, in our judgement the majority of anticipated beneﬁts, including
those directed at the environment and food safety, initially go to producers
and consumers of the products. For Australian primary industries, distor
tions from government policies are small, but obviously this is not the case
for many other countries. On the other hand, in some cases production
involves external costs, for example waste chemicals, and these will imply
different relations between social and producer beneﬁts from various types
of research than those considered in the present paper. And, as noted
above, heterogeneity of producers means that the assumed RDC objective
of maximising producer surplus may be too simple. The incorporation of
such complications can be expected to add to the potential for discrepancies
between national and producer optimal choices, reinforcing the conclusion
that the simple blanket policy of 1:1 matching grants is likely to be subop
timal but that to do better is likely to require speciﬁc, careful, and difﬁcult
empirical analysis.
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Appendix
The equations for the optimal levy rates discussed in sections 3 and 4 are
derived below.
Parallel supply curve shift
For the case of a parallel shift in supply, the equilibrium quantity and price
are found by solving equations (6) and (7), namely:
Q1 =

γ − α (R) − t
δ +β

(21)

P1 =

γ β + δα (R) + δ t
δ +β

(22)

where P1 is the consumer price, gross of tax, and the producer price is given
by P1 − t.
Recall the expression for net national surplus allowing for trade and the
marginal excess burden of taxation (equation (9)):
NS1 =

 g 
1
(κ δ + β )Q 12 )− (1 + d 
 R.
2
1 + g 

(23)

Differentiating with respect to R, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimum is:

∂ NS1
∂Q
 g 
= (κ δ + β )Q1 1 )− (1 + d 
 = 0, or
∂R
∂R
1 + g 
∂ Q1
(1 + d )
g
=
.
∂R
Q1 (κ δ + β ) 1 + g

(24)

(25)

Differentiating the solution for Q1 in equation (21) with respect to R,

∂ Q1
∂t 
1  ∂α
=−
+
.

∂R
δ + β  ∂R ∂R 

(26)

Further, differentiating the market-clearing condition
R = (1 + g)tQ

(27)

with respect to R, and simplifying,
1
∂t
1 ∂Q 
= t −
.
∂R
 R Q ∂R 

(28)

Substituting the expression for ∂t/∂R from equation (28) into equation (26),
and deﬁning εC,R = −∂α /∂R · R /P, we obtain an alternative expression for
∂Q1 /∂R that holds at the equilibrium:

∂ Q1
εC ,R P1 − t
.
=
∂R
t(1 + g)[Q (δ + β ) − t]

(29)

Setting the expression for ∂Q1 /∂R from the ﬁrst-order condition, equation
(25), equal to the expression for ∂Q1 /∂R from the market clearing condi
tions, equation (29), we can eliminate the ∂Q1 /∂R terms altogether and
solve for the optimal levy rate τ = t/P:

η+ε 
τ = εC ,R 1 + (1 + d ) g
η + κ ε 


−1

−1


ηε
η+ε 
+ τ (1 + d ) g
.
1 + (1 + d ) g
(η + κ ε ) 
η + κ ε 
(30)
2

For typical values of τ, well less than 0.01, the last term in equation (30)
will be very close to zero and we can use equation (10) above, which ex
cludes the last term, as an approximation. Further, when g = 0, as is optimal
for a parallel supply shift, the last term equals zero.
For the producer optimum, the objective function is (equation (12)):
PS1 =

1
β Q 12 ,
2

(31)

and setting the derivative with respect to R equal to zero yields the ﬁrstorder condition for the producer’s maximisation problem:

∂ Q1
= 0.
∂R

(32)

Equations (26) through (29) still hold, because they are implied by the marketclearing conditions, so that

τ p = εC ,R =

εQ , R
.
ε

(33)

Pivotal supply curve shift
For the case of a pivotal shift in supply, the equilibrium quantity and price
are found by solving equations (14) and (15):

γ −α −t
δ + β φ (R)

(34)

γ βφ (R) + δ α + δ t
δ + β φ (R)

(35)

Q2 =
P2 =

where P2 is the consumer price, gross of tax, and the producer price is given
by P2 − t.
Recall the expression for net national surplus (equation (16)):
NS 2 =

 g 
1
(κ δ + βφ (R)Q 22 )− (1 + d 
 R.
2
1 + g 

(36)

Differentiating with respect to R, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimum
is:

∂NS 2 β 2 ∂φ
∂ Q2
 g 
= Q2
+ (κ δ + βφ )Q 2
)− (1 + d 
 = 0, or
∂R
2
∂R
∂R
1 + g 
∂ Q2

β
∂φ 
1
g
=
− Q 22  .
(1 + d )
(1 + g) 2
∂R
Q 2 (κ δ + βφ ) 
∂R 

(37)

(38)

Using the deﬁnition of εQ,R = − (∂φ /∂R)R, equation (38) simpliﬁes to:

∂ Q2
2t (1 + d ) g + β Q2 εQ ,R
=
∂R
2t (1 + g )(κ δ + βφ )Q 2

(39)

Differentiating the solution for Q2 in equation (34) with respect to R,

∂ Q2
1  ∂t
∂φ 
=−
+ Q 2β
.

∂R
δ + βφ  ∂R
∂R 

(40)

The expression for ∂ t/∂R in equation (28) is still valid, since the deﬁnition
of research spending holds regardless of the assumption about the type of
research-induced supply shift. Substituting the expression for ∂ t/∂R into
equation (40) and using the deﬁnition of εQ,R = −(∂φ /∂R)R, we obtain an
alternative expression for ∂ Q2 /∂R that holds at the equilibrium:

∂Q 2
εQ ,R β Q2 − t
=
.
∂R
t(1 + g)[Q 2 (δ + βφ ) − t]

(41)

Setting the expression for ∂ Q2 /∂R from the ﬁrst-order condition, equation
(39), equal to the expression for ∂ Q2 /∂R from the market clearing conditions,

equation (41), we can eliminate the ∂ Q2 /∂R terms altogether and solve for
the optimal levy rate τ = t/P:

τ =

εQ , R
ε



2(η + κ ε ) − (η + ε )


 2(η + κ ε ) + 2(1 + d ) g (η + ε ) − ηεQ ,R 



2 (1 + d ) gηε
+τ2
.
 2(η + κ ε ) + 2(1 + d ) g (η + ε ) − ηεQ ,R 

(42)

For typical values of τ and εQ,R, both well less than 0.01, the last term in
equation (42) will be very close to zero and we can use equation (17) above,
which excludes the last term from (42), as an approximation.
For the producer optimum, the objective function is (equation (18)):
PS 2 =

1
βφ (R) Q 22 ,
2

(43)

and setting the derivative with respect to R equal to zero yields the ﬁrstorder condition for the producer’s maximum:

∂ Q2
εQ , R
=
.
∂R
2t (1 + g)

(44)

Equation (41) still holds, because it is implied by the market-clearing con
ditions. Setting equation (41) equal to equation (44) allows us to solve for
the producer’s optimal levy rate:

τp =

εQ , R  η − ε 

,
2 − εQ ,R  ηε 

(45)

which is approximated by equation (19), which is good for typical values of
εQ,R, less than 0.01.

